Chief of Staff Fajinhan of Germany and his predecessor, Major Maurice Johnson, had drastically different ways of handling things.
Major Maurice adhered to a non-interference attitude towards front-line commanders, only responsible for formulating macro strategies, while the micro-level operations were left to the commanders of the various Army Groups at the front line.
However, Fajinhan was different. As the newly appointed Chief of Staff of Germany, Fajinhan not only fully participated in the formulation of macro strategies but also frequently commanded and directed each of the Army Groups on the front line.
Regarding the potential opportunity of encircling all Russian armies for a complete wipeout, Fajinhan proposed his perspective: He suggests the deployment of soldiers for a two-way attack, with the primary attack still led by Makenson, who had just achieved a massive victory. The direction of the attack would be the area between the Vivace River and the Bug River.
The second course would involve moving the 12th Army Group in the direction of East Prussia towards the protruding root of Poland aiming to completely slice off the protruding region of Poland.
However, Hindenburg, the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front Army, had an entirely different perspective.
Hindenburg believed that launching an attack from the Neman River, passing through Kovno, and directly inserting into Minsk from the rear of Russia could not only seize a large chunk of Russian Territory, including Poland, but could also eliminate more of the primary forces in the Russian Army and create a decisive victory on the Eastern Front.
The plan proposed by Fajinhan still involves waging war in the Polish region, while Hindenburg's plan has already infringed upon Russian Territory, extending nearly 200 km more than Russia's borders.
Indeed, circumventing their way to Minsk would be able to cut off the rear route of the Eastern Front Russian Army and yield more battle results.
However, the problem is that such an in-depth plan exercise would have to involve the deployment of more soldiers to ensure the security of the flank of the Army.
A higher number of soldiers also implies a greater logistical backup, posing an issue for the logistical department in Germany.
Bear in mind that, despite the highly developed transportation in the East Prussian Region, it doesn't imply that the transportation in Poland and within Russia is sufficiently developed.
Compared to Germany's developed railway and highway networks, Russia's traffic environment is more primitive. Not only is it more challenging to mobilize forces, persistently carrying out tasks is an unbearable burden.
The more critical factor was that, as it was already almost September, winter in Russia was not far away. If they could not conclude the battle rapidly before the onset of winter, for the German soldiers, it would be an icy, snow-covered hell.
By that time, in addition to the regular food and supplies, the logistical department in Germany would have to transport a large amount of cotton-padded clothing and winter items to prevent the German army from getting frostbites.
Considering several factors, the plan proposed by Hindenburg was less feasible in practice. The logistical department in Germany could not guarantee that the deployed German army would receive adequate supplies of goods. It goes without saying that during the winter, it was difficult to ensure that every German soldier would be distributed cotton-padded clothing and winter items.
Being the two most influential individuals within the German military at the time, neither Fajinhan nor Hindenburg could convince each other, resulting in the German army continually failing to decide on the final battle plan against Russia.
Given that the best opportunity to eliminate the Russian Army was on the brink of being missed, out of helplessness, Fajinhan had no choice but to persuade William II.
Compared to the obstinate Hindenburg, William II was comparatively easy to convince.
Fajinhan was straightforward with his assertion that Hindenburg was a brash and stubborn fellow who eagerly sought merit.
According to him, Hindenburg's plan was entirely unworkable. The vastness of Russian territory allows ample room for manoeuvre.
It is worth noting that, knowing that the Russian army did not have enough firearms, the German artillery was even very close to the Russian frontline, with the nearest distance being less than one kilometer. Find your next adventure on m_v l|e-novelhall.net
Such a close-distance direct assault is equivalent to firing a rifle at a distance of one meter, and the accuracy rate would greatly increase.
Of course, as the hit rate increases, the lethality of this close-range artillery also becomes astonishingly large.
Benefiting from the closer distance, German artillery could hit Russian trenches with precision, killing large numbers of Russian soldiers in the trenches.
The grim scene was touching, and even the German officers couldn't help but pity these tragically killed Russian soldiers.
Of course, as soldiers, they might only pity for a few seconds and then attack the Russian army with a more powerful attitude.
The Russian army held out in these two areas for four days, at the cost of nearly 100,000 casualties, before their line collapsed and they retreated in disarray.
In mid-September, when German troops forcibly crossed the Bug River, Russia finally deployed planes purchased from Australasia for the first time and launched a fierce bombing campaign against the German-Austrian forces crossing the river, continuously firing machine guns.
This was the first time the Russian army had used airplanes in war, as well as the first time in Russian history that they had coordinated air and ground operations, marking a noteworthy moment in Russian military history.
Russia deployed more than a dozen planes, dropping over three tons of bombs over several days.
After some urgent training from Australasian experts, Russia had trained more than a dozen pilots, which enabled them to deploy planes in combat for the first time.
Fortunately, the first deployment of the planes resulted in significant military success, leading Nicholas II to rejoice that his money had been well-spent on airplanes.
After the 11th Group Army's attempt to forcibly cross the river failed, in East Prussia, the German 12th Group Army also began to launch an offensive from the downstream of the Narev River in Pushasnihi.
In contrast to the Russian army that the 11th Group Army faced, the Russian soldiers faced by the German 12th Group Army were much weaker.
When attacking Galicia, Russia had transferred some of its elite troops to the Southwestern Front, which had resulted in the combat capability of some Russian troops in the East Prussian region not being strong.
Under the fierce artillery attack of the 12th Group Army, the Russian army could only retreat into the city and engage in urban warfare with the German army by utilizing the chaotic streets of the city.
For a while, the German army, which hadn't prepared much, suffered heavy casualties in the urban war.
The Russian army fully capitalized on the guerrilla tactics of moving after each shot, causing chaos among the German troops who couldn't even locate their enemy.
Reinforcements from other regions managed to repulse the German troops, leading to the failure of the attempt by Galvarez, the commander of the 12th Group Army, to forcibly cross the Narev River.
However, Galvarez calmly thought of another good method, which was to cross the river in other areas by detouring.
After some searching, Galvarez finally found a region where the Russian force was relatively weak, and forcibly crossed the Narev River from the region of Rochatni, and successfully controlled the important ferry on the Narev River.